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1
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Most employers installed sexual harassment grievance procedures
and sensitivity training by the late 1990s. It was personnel experts,
not courts, legislatures, or lawyers, who promoted these antihar-
assment strategies, drawn from the profession’s tool kit. Personnel
succeeded because it was executives, notpublicofﬁcials,whodeﬁned
professional jurisdiction, and executives proved susceptible to per-
sonnel’s argument that bureaucratic routines could reduce legalrisk.
With each landmark in harassment law, more employers adopted
the grievance procedures personnel advocated despite negative re-
views from lawyers. Employers who consulted personnel experts
were more likely to join the bandwagon; those who consulted law-
yers were less likely. The case holds lessons for the evolution of
professions, because executives play an increasing role in deﬁning
professional jurisdiction.
Personnel managers and lawyers began to debate how employers could
protect themselves from liability for sexual harassment in the late 1970s.
Personnel experts recommended two arrows from their professional
quiver, grievance procedures and training programs. Many lawyers ar-
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viewers for helpful comments. Direct correspondence to Frank Dobbin, Department
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gued that no bureaucratic ﬁx would sufﬁce, and some pointed out that
grievance procedures might give employers knowledge that would make
them liable for harassment. Neither grievance procedures nor training
provided much legal protection until 1998, when the Supreme Court ruled
that they could be used by defendants in certain kinds of cases. By then
19 out of 20 big employers had harassment grievance procedures, and 7
out of 10 provided training. More employers offered grievance procedures
than unpaid maternity leaves, which were explicitly required by federal
law. We investigate how two professions constructed the threat of sexual
harassment and the appropriate organizational response to it during a
period when case law and social norms were changing rapidly.
As the formal organization has absorbed more and more of social life,
jurisdictional disputes between professional groups increasingly play out
before executives rather than public ofﬁcials. Professions win jurisdiction
not through state licensure, but by popularizing the managementpractices
they favor. Our theoretical contribution concerns the professional strat-
egies that work best before the audience of executives. Before state of-
ﬁcials, the classic liberal professions won jurisdiction by demonstrating
expertise and knowledge. Before organizationalexecutives,successfulpro-
fessional claims look different. Executives are concerned with reducing
risks that can threaten their livelihood, yet they often judge the success
of a new organizational initiative by whether it runs smoothly and has
predictable costs, rather than by whether it meets the original goals (Van
de Ven et al. 1999). Expert groups that catalyze concern about risk and
provide bureaucratic solutions can thus trump those that claim superior
expertise. In this case, personnel’s ready bureaucratic remedy trumped
lawyers’ counsel, which was to consult attorneys at the ﬁrst sign of ha-
rassment. In the end, personnel won government sanction by convincing
enough executives, rather than convincing executives by winning gov-
ernment sanction.
Professional modus operandi explains the divergent advice proffered
by personnel and legal experts. Personnel’s advice was based in the ﬁeld’s
tradition of building bureaucracy, a tradition dating to the 1930s when
personnel experts and lawyers divided up the turf of labor relations. At-
torneys’ advice was based in their traditional deference to case law and
their technology of case consultation. When harassment came on stage,
the two professions revived their old labor relations roles.
We bring two types of evidence to bear on the question ofhowpersonnel
and legal experts shaped employer antiharassment measures. First, we
describe the advice offered by these professions as sexual harassment law
changed. We also summarize a systematic review of the articles published
in personnel and legal journals between 1977 and 1997, where we ﬁnd
that personnel articles often mentioned grievance procedures and trainingLegal Compliance
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as compliance strategies, while legal articles rarely mentioned training
and often mentioned grievance procedures only to argue that they would
not protect employers. Second, our quantitative analyses of the spread of
sexual harassment grievance procedures, broader “general” harassment
procedures, and antiharassment training programs among 389 employers
between 1965 and 1997 conﬁrm two interesting hypotheses. First, each
time a legal landmark seemed to ratchet up the risk of a harassment
lawsuit, executives became signiﬁcantly more likely to follow the early
advice ofpersonnel experts(andlesslikelytoheedwarningsfromlawyers).
Increases in the perceived legal risk enabled personnel experts to trump
the obvious expertise of lawyers, who gradually came around themselves.
Second, the professions had direct inﬂuence through their consultative
roles. Executives who consulted legal experts were less likely to install
harassment procedures; those who consulted personnel were more likely.
THE PROFESSIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS
The classic literature on the professions focused on how particular groups
won public conﬁdence and credentials (Friedson 1975; Sarfatti-Larsen
1977; Starr 1982). Andrew Abbott revolutionized the ﬁeld with a systems
perspective on professionalization projects, attentive to the contending
groups that vie for authority in a given domain. In ancien regime France,
Abbott (1988, p. 157) observes, the groups competing for work as healers
included “physicians, surgeons, pharmacists, ‘empirics,’ operators, spa-
giristes, and . . . the various members of the clergy.” Most relevant to
the case at hand, Abbott ﬁnds different patterns of contention over legal
authority in Britain, where lawyers were scarce and hence facedterritorial
invasion from adjacent groups (accountants, justices of the peace, etc.)
and the United States, where lawyers were not in short supply. Whereas
Abbott paints a broad historical picture of professional contests, we ex-
plore how expert groups have recently vied for authority in a new venue,
the executive suite.
Institutionalists have examined how experts seek to establish authority
within organizations (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Fligstein 1990), but they
have not much explored what happens when two groups vie for authority
over the same issue (but see Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger 1992;
Stryker 2000). We chart the most recent episode in a longstanding struggle
between personnel and law over compliance with labor law. It stands to
reason that in matters of law, executives would listen tolawyers.Personnel
succeeded by appealing to executives’ concern with risk, and preference
for stable bureaucratic compliance strategies over lawyers’ one-case-at-
a-time approach. Managerial perceptions of legal risk were heightenedAmerican Journal of Sociology
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by the ambiguity of civil rights law in general and harassment law in
particular (Edelman 1992). Personnel experts exaggerated the risk faced
by the average employer and exaggerated the legal protection to be found
in grievance procedures and training, as we show below. Yet their strat-
egies were widely adopted and eventually vetted by the Supreme Court.
The roots of the personnel and legal professions explain their different
initial responses to harassment law. From the 1920s the personnel pro-
fession developed expertise in employee placement and labor relations
around a core technology of bureaucratization (Brandes 1976; Brody
1980). After the Wagner Act of 1935 empowered unions, personnel experts
negotiated union contracts alongside labor lawyers and went on to im-
plement the grievance procedures, seniority systems, job classiﬁcation
schemes, and pension programs written into those contracts. Later, per-
sonnel matched these bureaucratic systems in large nonunion ﬁrms (Ko-
chan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Selznick 1969).
The legal profession had ﬂourished earlier; with the rise of the modern
corporation, lawyers set up shop as independent professionals with a
technology of case consultation (Abbott 1988, p. 247). Lawyers claimed
the singular ability to offer precedent-based advice that would stand up
in court. Even after lawyers joined the payroll as house counsel (Leicht
and Fennell 1996) they acted as consultants on individual cases and con-
tracts—they did not design bureaucratic systems for managing legalissues
(Nelson and Nielsen 2000).
Their different professional modus operandi shaped the solutions to the
problem of harassment that personnel experts and lawyers envisioned.
Comparing how lawyers and scientists behave in the same organization,
Robin Stryker (2000, p. 196) ﬁnds that different professional groups are
“trained and socialized to promote the rules” and organizational problem-
solving approaches “that best deﬁne their professional identity and that
they believe are right and appropriate.” Thus solutions groups develop
that reﬂect a sort of “bounded rationality” (March and Simon 1958),
bounded not by familiar organizational routines but by familiar profes-
sional routines.
The two professions’ different approaches can be seen in Edelman et
al.’s (1992) study of wrongful discharge law. The personnel journals ex-
aggerated the risk of wrongful discharge suits, blithely telling employers
that bureaucracy—in the form of employment-at-will clauses—couldpro-
tect them. Their authority came from the claim that they could predict
the law’s trajectory. “Since few employers actually read statute books or
case reporters, . . . inter-organizational professionals have become social
ﬁlters who determine how employers perceive legal threats, how they
understand the law, and how they construct the compliancerequirements”
(Edelman 2002, p. 195). Legal journals more accurately represented theLegal Compliance
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modest risk to employers and did not argue that a new, untestedprocedure
could inoculate employers. Their authority came from the claim that they
knew what the law actually said. Sutton and Dobbin (1996, p. 808) argue
that personnel was the more entrepreneurial profession: “Their marginal
position in ﬁrms inclines them to embrace unproven compliance recipes.
The legal profession is, by nature, conservative and self-referential.” Per-
sonnel managers were “explorers” of uncharted compliance measures,and
employment lawyers were “settlers,” working out details of these clauses
after courts had found in favor of them.
Things might have evolved differently. It is easy to imagine a world
in which civil rights issues would be monopolized by the ﬁeld of law.
France and Germany come close to that ideal, for personnel managers
there have done little to respond to discrimination or harassment law
(Bleich 2000; Saguy 2003). The role of personnel grew, historically, in the
United States in large measure because in labor relations and civil rights
law, legislation was ambiguous, and the common law system and frag-
mentation of authority across federal, state, and local governments made
the law especially susceptible to change (Dobbin and Sutton 1998). Per-
sonnel claimed to be able to develop bureaucratic inoculations against
future judicial and administrativerulings.Itwasnotaforegoneconclusion
that personnel would play such a central role, whereas attorneys could
count on disputes redounding to them and so were sure of playing a role.
Next we analyze the advice personnel experts and lawyers offered em-
ployers in print, developing predictionsto betestedinthefollowingsection
on the diffusion of harassment programs. Advicewasdirectedatpersonnel
experts within organizations and at lawyers who worked inside or con-
sulted with organizations, and it provided arguments for these profes-
sionals to use as they attempted to sell executives on their solutions to
the threat of sexual harassment liability. In 60 in-depth interviews with
personnel managers in randomly sampled workplaces in California, Min-
nesota, New Jersey, and New York, conducted between 1997 and 2001,
we learned that top managers approve training programs and grievance
procedures. Many personnel managers complained of having to ﬁght for
programs. An HR (human resources) manager in publishing explained
that a company executive killed the idea of harassment training, arguing,
“If [sexual harassment] goes on, and if they attend training, they’re going
to realize: ‘My God I was being harassed.’Andthey’llsueus.”Professional
journals provided the materials for professionals to counter suchconcerns.
Two Professions Proffer Advice on Harassment
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not outlaw sexual harassment by name
but, after a rocky start in the courts, sexual harassment claims gainedAmerican Journal of Sociology
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traction beginning in 1976. Three federal courts found that when a su-
pervisor makes an employee’s job contingent on submission to his sexual
advances, he (or, rarely, she) has engaged in sex discrimination under Title
VII of the act. In 1986, the Supreme Court found hostile-environment
sexual harassment to be illegal, and in 1991, Congress added full com-
pensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiff’s pot. These three legal
milestones brought new attention to harassment. Next we discuss each
legal landmark and the advice that personnel and legal experts put
forward.
Legal Landmark 1: Harassment Is Discrimination
Federal judges ﬁrst heard the claim thaton-the-jobharassmentconstitutes
sex discrimination nearly a decade after Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act. At ﬁrst they scoffed at the idea. In Barnes v. Train (13 FEP [D. D.C.
1974]), Corne v. Bausch and Lomb (390 F. Supp. 161 [D. Ariz. 1975]), and
Tomkins v. Public Service Electric and Gas (422 F. Supp. 553 [D. N.J.
1976]) federal judges found that the Civil Rights Act does not cover sexual
harassment. In the 1975 case the court found the actions of the supervisor
charged with making employment contingent on sexual submission “to
be nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism. By
his alleged sexual advances, Mr. Price was satisfying a personal urge” and
concluded that “there is nothing in the (Civil Rights) Act which could
reasonably be constructed to have it apply to verbal and physical sexual
advances by another employee” (390 F. Supp at 163). In the 1976 case
the District Court of New Jersey found that sexual assaults do not con-
stitute sex discrimination because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act “is not
intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical
attacks motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which
happens to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley” (422
F. Supp. 553).
The courts took employers by surprise in 1976 and 1977, deﬁning ha-
rassment as employment discrimination. In 1976, in Williams v. Saxbe
(413 F. Supp. 654), a federal court ﬁrst found that when a supervisor ﬁres
a worker for refusing his sexual advances, he has discriminated under
Title VII. In 1977 three federal courts ruled that it was illegal to make
an employee, in Catharine MacKinnon’s (1979) words, “put out or get
out.” These decisions made clear that employers were potentially liable
for quid pro quo harassment, but they did not offer employers a way to
protect themselves against liability. The decision overturning the 1974
ruling against Barnes implied that a written policy forbidding harassment
might help to shield employers, but none of the rulings promoted internal
grievance systems.Legal Compliance
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Personnel’s Advice
In writing about harassment, personnel experts exaggerated the risk of
lawsuits by citing four surveys showing that between 70% and 90% of
working women had experienced harassment. In 1976 the women’s mag-
azine Redbook published a mail-in questionnaire and reported that an
astounding 90% of women had experienced unwanted sexual attention
on the job (Safran 1976). The Redbook study and results of a survey
conducted at a sexual harassment conference, showing that 70% of work-
ing women had been harassed, were widely reported in places like Per-
sonnel Journal (Hoyman and Robinson 1980) and the New York Times
(Haberman 1980). When random-sample studies showed harassment to
be less common, personnel writers rarely covered the news (Gallup Or-
ganization 1991; Spann 1990).
The grievance procedure.—Personnel professionals had established
grievanceproceduresin union negotiationsafterthepassageoftheWagner
Act of 1935. They later sold these to nonunion ﬁrms as insurance against
union drives so that by 1955, 99% of unionized ﬁrms and 80% of large
nonunion ﬁrms had grievance procedures (Selznick 1969). Later they
formed civil rights grievance procedures in the same mold. After De-
partment of Justice personnel experts created a civil rights procedure for
internal complaints (Order No. 420-69, 34 FR 12281, July 25, 1969), ex-
perts recommended the same for high-proﬁle signatories of Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) consent decrees—AT&T, the
Bank of California, Paciﬁc Gas and Electric, El Paso Natural Gas, and
the major steel and trucking ﬁrms (Schaeffer 1975). By the late 1970s,
personnel journals contended that grievance procedures could protectem-
ployers from Civil Rightscomplaintsin court(Berenbeim1980;Gery1977,
p. 203; Marino 1980, p. 32), despite the fact that grievance procedures
had not yet protected a single employer in court (Edelman, Uggen, and
Erlanger 1999).
Building on this history, personnel experts advised in articles in leading
journals—Personnel, Public Personnel Management,t h eHarvard Busi-
ness Review—that managers should establish a “good faith effort” to stop
harassment by creating a special harassment grievance system (Spann
1990). Several articles discussed the harassment grievance procedure and
training video that Adrienne Tomkins and her attorney had won in their
out-of-court settlement in 1977 against Public Service Electric and Gas,
after a district court overturned the 1976 dismissal of her case (Shah and
Agrest 1979). The effect of these articles was to give personnel directors
ammunition to take to their bosses. Similarly, MIT’s ombudsperson Mary
Rowe (1981, p. 46) argued in Harvard Business Review that a grievance
procedure could intercept complaints en route to court. This was a com-American Journal of Sociology
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mon claim, though Edelman et al. (1999) later found that grievance pro-
cedures do not reduce harassment complaints to the government. Others
argued that a procedure could reduce harassment itself: “To be effective
in lessening sexual harassment, [a speciﬁc harassment] procedure would
have to be well-known throughouttheorganization,ensureconﬁdentiality,
and be under the authority of a highly credible, powerful individual”
(Somers and Clementson-Mohr 1979, p. 26).
The most dramatic claim was that grievance procedures could protect
employers in court. The EEOC issued “Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of Sex” on November 10, 1980, that deﬁned sexual harassment as
sex discrimination under Title VII and advised “developing appropriate
sanctions.”
2 Personnel managers translated this into a federal directive to
set up grievance procedures and suggested that grievance procedures
would provide legal protection (Hoyman and Robinson 1980). Twohuman
resources professors published an article in Personnel in 1981 titled “Sex-
ual Harassment: The Employer’s Legal Obligations” that began: “Em-
ployers can protect themselves against liability for sexual harassment
charges with a strong policy against such activity and a grievance pro-
cedure that expedites the processing of such complaints” (Linenbergerand
Keaveny 1981a, p. 60). They claimed that the courts had accepted griev-
ance procedures: “Several courts have suggested steps an employer can
take to escape liability. . . . Liability can be avoided if two conditions
have been met: (1) The employer has a policy discouraging sexual ha-
rassment, and the employee failed to use an existing grievance procedure
and (2) the sexually harassing situations are rectiﬁed as soon as the em-
ployer becomes aware of them” (Linenberger and Keaveny 1981a, pp. 65–
66). Linenberger and Keaveny (1981b, pp. 14–15) argued in the same year,
in Human Resource Management (HRM), that “liability may be avoided
if the . . . employee has failed to present the matter to a publicized
2 The guidelines deﬁned harassment as: “Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly
a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.” It went on to suggest that harassment could be per-
petrated by co-workers or others in the workplace, and then offered broad suggestions
for preventing harassment: “Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual
harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment
from occurring, such as afﬁrmatively raising the subject, expressingstrongdisapproval,
developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how
to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing methods to sensitize
all concerned” (45 FR 74677, Nov. 10, 1980).Legal Compliance
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grievance board” and went on to say that “to ensure compliance with
Title VII” employers “must establish a written grievance procedure which
explains the steps a victim of sexual harassment should follow to make
her complaint known to upper management.”
These articles fabricated judicial support for grievance procedures. In
the Personnel article the authors did not actually cite a case, but in HRM
they cited Miller v. Bank of America (418 F. Supp. 233 N.D. Cal. 1976),
in which the employer’s claim that a grievance procedure should protect
him had been rejected by the appellate court in 1979, as we will see below
in the Harvard Law Review treatment of the same case. Defense attorneys
trotted out grievance procedures as evidence that their clients did not
condone harassment, to be sure, but the federal courts were generally
unimpressed with this defense.
Even articles that accurately depicted case law tended to leave the
impression that grievance procedures were mandatory. A January 1980
article in Personnel Administrator used a version of “Simon says,” listing
requirements the courts had established, such as rapid response to com-
plaints, and then continuing: “It is extremely important for a company
to have an established grievance procedure. . . . These proceduresshould
be in written form and available to all employees” (Sawyer and Whatley
1980, p. 37). Only the closest reading would reveal that the courts had
not mandated grievance procedures.
It was easy to argue that grievance procedures would provide legal
protection; they were lawlike, with rights to counsel, to privacy, to an
open hearing, to a neutral grievance panel, and to appeal. Sanctions were
clearly deﬁned. Personnel experts suggested that employees would have
to use company procedures before appealing to the courts because that
is how union grievance procedures worked for violations of labor law.
But in civil rights cases complainants were not legally bound to exhaust
company grievance systems before going to court. This would change,
but not for 20 years and only for employees who agreed in writing to
arbitrate employment disputes. In 2001, in Circuit City Stores v. St. Clair
Adams (121 S. Ct. 1302), the Supreme Court decided by ﬁve to four that
an employer could require a worker who had signed such an agreement
to submit harassment claims to arbitration.
Harassment sensitivity training.—Personnel had long-run skill and
management training and in the late 1960s developed“sensitivity”training
for managers (Barley and Kunda 1992; Bennis1963; LawrenceandLorsch
1967; Lowin, Hrapchak, and Kavanaugh 1969; Robin 1967; Scott 1968).
In the early 1970s personnel consultants began to recommend civil rights
sensitivity training as a way to prevent discrimination, and this became
widely popular under the moniker “diversity training” (Kelly and Dobbin
1998).American Journal of Sociology
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From the time of the 1977 district court rulings, advocacy groups and
HR experts recommended harassment training modeled on civil rights
training. The Working Women’s Institute told Business Week in 1979
(Business Week 1979, p. 120) that there was widespread interest in the
in-houseworkshopsthey werethendeveloping.InJanuaryof1980Sawyer
and Whatley (1980, p. 38) wrote in Personnel Administrator that super-
visors should be trained to understand the kinds of actions that might
imperil employers: “Any action which makes current or future employ-
ment contingent on acquiescence to sexualadvancesordemandsisillegal.”
After the EEOC suggested in its 1980 guidelines that employers should
make their policies against harassment known to employees, HR spe-
cialists began using language suggesting that the law required training.
An article in Personnel Journal in 1981 titled “Effective Training and the
Elimination of Sexual Harassment” begins with the bold (and groundless)
claim: “Prominent communication of corporate policy opposing harass-
ment in the workplace [i.e., training], and the existence of in-house com-
plaint procedures, are mandatory since a number of judicial actions have
placed strong reliance on such measures” (emphasis added; Kronenberger
and Bourke 1981, p. 879; see also McIntyre and Renick 1982, p. 289;
Renick 1980, p. 661). In contrast to these claims in the professional jour-
nals, our review of the case law revealed almost no discussion of training
in the early 1980s. The notable exception was a district court case (Arnold
v. Seminole 614 F. Supp. 853, 1985) in which a city government was
required to institute training after the court decided it was responsible
for ongoing and severe harassment of a female worker. In the court de-
cision, training is discussed only as a remedy, not as a preventative mea-
sure to reduce employer liability.
Advice from Lawyers
Legal journals followed case law more closely and were more circumspect
in offering concrete suggestions. Writersadvisedemployerstoconsultwith
lawyers about individual cases and also raised concerns about the poten-
tial for grievance procedures to create more problems than they solved.
Call your attorney.—Lawyers argued that employers should take quick
corrective action, in consultation with an attorney and in response to the
speciﬁc facts of the case. The early law articles quoted theTomkinsdistrict
court case from 1977; Title VII is violated when a supervisor harasses
“and the employer does not take prompt and remedial action after ac-
quiring . . . knowledge” (e.g., Burge 1984, p. 802). This meant calling the
lawyers in, disciplining the harasser, and ensuring that the harassed em-
ployee did not suffer retaliation for complaining. As John Attanasio (1982,
p. 32) argued, the Constitution and Title VII “relieve an employer ofLegal Compliance
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liability . . . if it takes corrective action. In constitutional terms, the prin-
ciple that a plaintiff cannot continue to litigate once she has been afforded
her requested relief is commonly called ‘mootness.’” In the words of the
Tomkins court, corrective action “in the face of litigation” is “equivocal
in purpose, motive, and permanence” (quoted in Attanasio 1982, p. 35).
Employers should seek counsel and offer a remedy the moment they get
wind of harassment because courts did not give employers credit for
changes made once a lawsuit was under way.
The legal advice to call your attorney was also based on a close reading
of case law. Those who knew the details of sexual harassment cases at
this time knew that the law was unsettled. Judges were experimenting
with different legal theories and different standards for making a case.
Their decisions made much of distinctions between types of harassment
(quid pro quo and hostile environment) and type of harasser (supervisor
and co-worker). Lawyers noted these distinctions and advised employers
to call in an attorney to determine the best response to each individual
case. By contrast, personnel advised the routinization of organizational
response.
Grievance procedures: What you don’t know can’t hurt you.—Law re-
views at ﬁrst discounted the idea that the courts would favor grievance
procedures, for in early quid pro quo cases, courts explicitly ruled that
employers were “strictly liable” for harassment by supervisors—meaning
that no bureaucratic precautions could reduce liability. As a Harvard Law
Review (1984, p. 1461) piece noted, courts had not found that grievance
procedures shielded employers: “The defendant in Miller was held strictly
liable for harassment by all its employees, despite its expresspolicyagainst
sexual harassment and despite its creation of procedures for grievance
resolution.” The court in the Miller case cited four other federal appellate
courts to argue that employers are strictly liable for harassment by su-
pervisors, regardless of their policies and regardless of whether or not
they were in the dark. The Review interpreted the EEOC’s brief 1980
guidelines on sex discrimination as supporting grievance procedures, but
argued: “Because the EEOC does not have the statutory authority to issue
regulations . . . the Guidelines’ standards can acquire the force of law
only through adoption by the Supreme Court” (Burge 1984).
The courts had upheld different standards of liability in quid pro quo
and hostileenvironmentcases,butneithersupportedgrievanceprocedures
according to some law reviews. In quid pro quo cases, as in discrimination
cases in which harassment was not an issue, the courts had upheld the
strict liability standard: grievance procedures and otherpreventativemea-
sures did not absolve employers of liability for discrimination, and plain-
tiffs did not have to exhaust grievance mechanisms before going to court
(Michigan Law Review 1978). In hostile environment cases, some lowerAmerican Journal of Sociology
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courts had upheld a “knowledge” standard under which employers had
to know of harassment to be held liable. Grievance procedures might thus
be dangerous, giving employers knowledge that could put them at risk.
Law reviews could be quite blunt about the dangers of grievance pro-
cedures. The Harvard Law Review (1984, p. 1462) article reiterated that
current case law discouraged grievance procedures, for employers had
“an incentive to remain ignorant.” Attanasio’s (1982, p. 31, emphasis
added) University of Cincinnati Law Review article warned, “Should
courts continue to refuse to impute to unknowing employers the sexual
discrimination of their supervisors, the policy against sexual discrimina-
tion could become see no evil, hear no evil. . . . The employer has little
incentive to encourage [complaints] because the fact remains that lack of
knowledge equals lack of liability.” A 1984 North Carolina Law Review
article dealt exclusively with the knowledge standard, pointing out that
from the start, some courts had made employers liable for harassment
only if they knew of it. The author quoted the Tomkins decision: “[We]
conclude that Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or
Constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or de-
mands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee’s
job status . . . on a favorable response” (Burge 1984, p. 803).
The standard of liability was a dominant theme in the legal articles
published between 1980 and 1990. Journals for practicing lawyers told
much the same story as academic law reviews. Ralph Baxter (1982, p.
20), writing in the American Bar Association journal Legal Economics,
asked the question: “Is the employer liable for sexual harassment by its
supervisors if it does not have ‘notice’ of the conduct?” The answer was
not clear. While some courts held employers liable for conduct they did
not know of, “Other courts . . . have rejected this ‘strict liability’ stan-
dard” (Baxter 1982, p. 20). They have “held that an employer is not liable
for sexual harassment by its supervisory employees unless it has notice
of the conduct” (Baxter 1982, p. 20). In other words, ignorance is legal
bliss.
After reviewing the professional advice on grievance procedures—and
ﬁnding such divergence across the two professions—we reviewed the case
law to try to understand what the courts were saying about these pro-
grams. We read the 23 district court decisions in hostile environmentcases
published in Lexis between 1977 (when federal courts found harassment
to be illegal) and 1985 (the year before Meritor). While there was con-
siderable variation across district courts in terms of the knowledge stan-
dard, it was clear that the courts favored prompt action when employers
learned of harassment. The courts gave credit for prompt action, whether
or not the employer had a formal grievance system in place.
Key to our argument is that the legal profession’s claim to jurisdictionLegal Compliance
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over matters of law was based in its knowledge of case law, and that the
profession’s modus operandi was to present relevant case law—in all its
complexity—and not to speculate wildly about the future. The reigning
advice from attorneys was to wait to see if the courts vetted grievance
procedures and, in the meantime, to call in attorneys to customize a
response to each complaint. Many lawyers were eventually won over to
grievance procedures, but we expect that on the whole, executives who
consulted attorneys on HR policy were less likely to install harassment
procedures.
Legal Landmark 2: The Supreme Court’s 1986 Meritor Decision
In its ﬁrst harassment case, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (40 FEP
1822, 477 U.S. 57 [1986]), the Supreme Court deﬁned “hostile environ-
ment” harassment as illegal. Catharine MacKinnon (1979), who had put
forward the idea, sat as co-counsel for Mechelle Vinson. Quid pro quo
harassment was, to most minds, both clear-cut and rare. Hostile envi-
ronment harassment, deﬁned by MacKinnon as repeated, unwanted sex-
ual attention, was neither clear-cut nor rare. Not only had the court
recognized hostile environment harassment as illegal, but as the American
Bar Association Journal noted in 1987, claims were growing: “‘Sexual
harassment cases were on the rise even before [Meritor],’ says William
C. Bruce, a management labor lawyer in New Haven, Conn. ‘The pub-
licity surrounding [the case] accelerated the trend, as more potentialplain-
tiffs saw that legal recourse is available’” (Machlowitz and Machlowitz
1987, p. 80). Yet the court had not outlined how employers might protect
themselves. In its opinion the court explicitly denied requestsfromcounsel
for both sides to clarify whether a grievance procedure could protect
employers, and said that the “mere existence of a grievance procedure
and a policy against discrimination” would not insulate employers from
liability (106 S. Ct. at 2408-9). In saying that the “mere existence” of a
procedure would not insulate employers, the court implied that a well-
constructed procedure might do so. Yet the court upheld the “knowledge”
standard, which seemed to disfavor grievance procedures.
Personnel’s Advice after Meritor
Personnel played up the court’s indication that it might accept a grievance
procedure as a defense, despite the court’s refusal to accept Meritor’s
procedure. The profession also emphasized that the court had accepted
a much broader deﬁnition of harassment that put many more employers
at risk. Now they advocated “general” antiharassment grievance proce-
dures to cover all bets (Bradshaw 1987; Domenick 1999, p. 786). An articleAmerican Journal of Sociology
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in Public PersonnelManagement toutedMadison,Wisconsin’s1981policy
which forbade “harassment on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, hand-
icap, national origin, or sexual orientation” (Spann 1990, p. 59).
This was when training really took off. “Company confusion and con-
cern have spurred a growth industry in training videos, seminars and
consultants” reported U.S. News and World Report in 1986. “Chase Man-
hattan Bank discourages employees from touching each other and runs
a 2-hour harassment-awareness program for managers. Atlantic Richﬁeld
distributes a ﬁlm and training materials to corporate divisions, but the
level of activity in each division varies. While the ambiguity surrounding
sexual harassment perplexes many managers, it’s a boon to the companies
that market videotapes and training programs” (Brophy 1986, p. 56).
Many of the 60 HR managers we interviewed between 1997 and 2001
parroted the press, describing the legal meaning of harassment as a mov-
ing target and emphasizing the need to train managers in what “hostile
environment” harassment was. An HR manager at a high-technology
company told us in 2000 that training was key: “There’s lots of types of
harassment. I think you have to start and make sure that the managers
really understand what that is and make sure that they’re not doing it
and give them the skills to be able to spot that with their employees.”
Unclear about what sexual harassment really was, employers created pro-
hibitions against behavior—a pat on the shoulder or romance between
peers—that no court had found to constitute harassment, as legal scholar
Vicki Schultz (2003) argues.
HR experts claimed that the training sessions they organized, modeled
on the civil rights/diversity training programs they had advocated, would
help to protect employers. Before the late 1990s, there was no evidence
that the courts would limit legal liability for organizations with training.
Even after the Supreme Court’s 1998 ruling that training could help to
shield employers against punitive damages in certain speciﬁc circum-
stances, HR experts overstated the legal support for training. As legal
scholar Susan Bisom-Rapp (2001a, p. 156) argues: “Some training ad-
vocates represent [the Supreme Court decisions] as expressly mandating
sexual harassment training, even though the decisions say absolutelynoth-
ing of the kind. Susan Meisinger, of the [Society for Human Resource
Management], puts it this way: ‘The Court said . . . if you don’t provide
some kind of sexual harassment training to your employees, you’re going
to be liable.’” That was far from the truth.
Lawyers after Meritor: Mixed Message from the Court
Law reviews and legal journals continued to advise employers to act
quickly when an employee complained of harassment, consulting lawyersLegal Compliance
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to determine an individualized remedy. As Gayle Ecabert wrote in the
Cincinnati Law Review, “An employer who has been put on notice that
sexual harassment exists in its workplace must take prompt remedial
action or be held liable.” But the issue of how employers could inoculate
themselves in advance had not been decided in Meritor. The Meritor
decision’s “terse guidelines lack the adequate analysis and speciﬁc detail
needed to make them of practical use” (Ecabert 1987, pp. 1195–96).
Reading the Meritor decision was tantamount to reading tea leaves.
Employment lawyers favored training programs, and many now inter-
preted the Supreme Court guidelines to suggest that a well-crafted griev-
ance procedure could protect employers. Yet both journals for practi-
tioners and law reviews continued to caution that grievance procedures
were not yet proven and might endanger employers. An article in Tort
and Insurance Law Journal emphasized that in the Meritor case, the
Supreme Court rejected “the bank’s contention that the mere existence
of a grievance procedure and Vinson’s failure to use it should have ab-
solved it” of responsibility and suggested that it was not yet clear whether
any procedure could help to shield employers (DolkartandMalchow1987,
p. 187). In 1990 the lead article in the Howard Law Journal reiterated
the point that ignorance of hostile-environment harassment could protect
employers: “an employer would not be held responsible for unlawful acts
of supervisors that it neither knew of nor condoned” (Turner 1990, p. 10).
In the Meritor decision the court had, after all, “rejected the bank’s ar-
gument that it was insulated from liability by virtue of its policy against
discrimination and a grievance procedure which Vinson failed to invoke”
(Turner 1990, p. 15). Moreover, a grievance procedure could make ha-
rassment “foreseeable” for a repeat offender, heightening legal jeopardy.
In Yates v. Avco Corp. (819 F.2d 630 [1987]) the sixth circuit court of
appeals faulted Avco for having failed to prevent a “foreseeable” situation
with an offender who had faced a formal grievance before. The Howard
article emphasized that foreseeability would ratchet up the employer’s
legal liability: “the establishment of employer foreseeability resultingfrom
the implementation of [a grievance procedure]—could have a signiﬁcant
impact in harassment cases” (Turner 1990, p. 17).
Law reviews reiterated that the courts had consistently upheld a “strict
liability” standard for quid pro quo harassment and noted that for the
increasingly common “hostile environment” cases, Meritor did not spell
out what an effective procedure should look like. In Meritor the court
introduced a negligence standard, under which grievance procedures and
training programs might have been argued to constitute evidence that the
employer was not negligent. Yet the law reviews tended to lead their
stories with the court’s refusal to vet the grievance procedure and toAmerican Journal of Sociology
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emphasize that employers could preclude a claim of negligence by re-
sponding to complaints rapidly.
Lower courts had not vetted grievance procedures either. Up to 1979,
of the thousands of Title VII race and sex discrimination cases of all sorts,
Edelman et al. (1999) found only four in which defendants claimed that
grievance procedures should have shielded them from liability and none
in which the courts accepted this defense. Between 1980 and the Meritor
decision in 1986, they found only nine cases mentioning grievance pro-
cedures, and only four in which courts accepted the grievance procedure
as even a partial defense. In four others, courts refused the idea that a
grievance procedure could provide any protection. In the six years fol-
lowing Meritor, 36 defendants invoked grievance procedures, and in only
12 of those cases did the courts accept the procedure as even a partial
defense. By the end of 1993, when our survey shows that over 60% of
employers had harassment grievance procedures, therewasscantevidence
that they did much good.
Law review articles that mentioned training generally spoke favorably
of it, but as we will see, they mentioned it rarely (Dolkart and Malchow
1987, p. 192; Ecabert 1987, p. 1191). A skeptical law professor later com-
mented on the growing belief that training could solve the problem: “This
belief, widely held and rarely questioned, has spawned a multi-billion
dollar sexual harassment and diversity training industry staffed by con-
sultants, management attorneys, and human resource professionals who
offer programs aimed at litigation prevention” (Bisom-Rapp 2001b,p .1 ) .
Legal Landmark 3: The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Before 1991, sex discrimination cases could embarrass employers,butthey
rarely cost employers much because sex discrimination plaintiffs, unlike
race discrimination plaintiffs, could notsueforcompensatoryandpunitive
damages. Successful harassment plaintiffs rarely netted more than a few
months of lost wages. New civil rights legislation changed that. Now
harassment plaintiffs could seek up to $300,000 each againstprivatesector
employers, and the plaintiff’s bar saw new potential in class action suits.
John Motley, vice president of the National Federation of Independent
Business, was quoted in Industry Week: “Let’s face it, until now, virtually
no business in the U.S. was exposed to jury trials, punitive damages, and
compensatory damages in intentional-discrimination lawsuits except
when dealing with racial harassment” (Verespej 1991, p. 64).Legal Compliance
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Personnel Emphasizes New Risks and New Remedies
Personnelexpertshad alwayswarnedthatharassmentsuitscouldbecostly
(Hoyman and Robinson 1980; Kronenberger and Bourke 1981), but their
words were more convincing after the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In the
1980s, it was the threat of tort actions, not Title VII suits, that seemed
to be the greatest ﬁnancial risk to employers (Wymer 1983). For example,
Los Angeles employment attorney Barbara Lindemann Schlei told the
Wall Street Journal in 1985 (Jacobs 1985, p. 1): “[A] pinch at the water
fountain has been the way of life in corporations. But that friendly pat
or squeeze is this year’s tort.” In the wake of Meritor, the popular press
reported that awards had increased. Awards had averaged $60,000 to
$70,000, U.S. News (Brophy 1986, p. 8) reported, but CBS had recently
agreed to settle a claim for $500,000, and a U.S. district court awarded
the former employee of an architectural ﬁrm $250,000.
HR managers capitalized on the heightened attention to sexual ha-
rassment that followed Clarence Thomas’s Supreme Court conﬁrmation
hearings, pointing out that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 increased the
ﬁnancial risk to private-sector employers. Business Week (1991, p. 190)
warned industry before the act even passed that under current law, ha-
rassment victims could only win back pay and “reinstatement in a job
they probably wouldn’t want. The draft legislation would provide for
damages of $50,000 to $300,000, depending on the size of the company.”
Industry Week wrote in “Longer Dockets, Deep Pockets” that “the in-
creased legal liability business will face from the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is sobering indeed” (Verespej 1991). In addition to
publicizing huge jury awards—like the $7.1 million that the largest law
ﬁrm in the country, Baker and McKenzie, was initially ordered to pay—
personnel journals also pointed out that class action suits could lead to
multimillion dollar payouts (Bingham and Gansler 2002).
The private-sector HR managers we interviewed also told us that high-
proﬁle cases like that of Mitsubishi, which faced a 12-year class action
that eventually netted $43.5 million for harassment plaintiffs in 1998,
caught the attention of executives. A high technology manager told us in
2001: “It doesn’t take too often to be pulled into the court by your earlobes
and threatened with millions of dollars. . . . It was the lawsuits that”
pushed executives to adopt programs. In the same year a utility company
manager told us he was updating harassment training “because we see
and we read that that’s been one of the fastest growing litigation areas.
. . . The courts are saying to protect yourself . . . you should have this,
and this, and this in place.” Cost also became more central in training.
Another high-technology manager told us that during training, managers
now “hear about some of the judgments awarded to people in sexualAmerican Journal of Sociology
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harassment cases, so they can see that it’s something you’re gonna have
to pay for.”
Personnel consultants stepped up their efforts to sell training programs
and grievance procedures—focusing on the new risks for private sector
employers in particular—and also retooled those grievance procedures in
the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This legislation made sex dis-
crimination and race discrimination cases more closely parallel by allow-
ing punitive and compensatory damages for both kinds of claims. With
the courts treating sex and race discrimination cases more similarly, it
seemed sensible for employers to do so as well. Organizations already had
blanket equal employment opportunity policies covering race and sex
discrimination in place. Now personnel experts stepped up promotion of
uniﬁed, “general antiharassment” procedures. We expect that general an-
tiharassment programs would begin to spread in the period after the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and that private sector employers, who were most
affected by this legal landmark, would be more likely to adopt new pro-
grams in this period.
Lawyers’ Mixed Message
By the early 1990s, a growing number of employment lawyers had come
to side with personnel experts, advising employers to establish grievance
systems in the hope that those systems would reduce harassment. Now
they argued less often that grievance procedures could backﬁre, but when
they argued for grievance procedures it was to suggest that they might
alter the climate, or at best make up part of a “good faith” effort defense.
In assessing what employers could do to prevent harassment, Deborah
Rhode (1992, p. 1465) wrote in the Southern California Law Review,
“Internal employer grievance mechanisms should be strengthened to pro-
vide real sanctions, real damages, and real conﬁdentiality protections.”
Lawyers did not make the extravagant claims that personnel experts
made, that grievance mechanisms could inoculate employers in court.
They continued to argue that swift response to news of harassment and
a remedy that satisﬁes the complainant was the best way to stay out of
court.
Analysis of Personnel and Legal Journals
We have been contrasting the advice offered in personnel and law jour-
nals. Next we document the pattern of advice we have been describing,
graphically depicting what the personnel and legal journalswereadvising.
We show that personnel journalsrecommendedtrainingasaremedymuch
more often than did law journals, and frequently recommended grievanceLegal Compliance
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procedures without mentioning that they might not protect employers.
The average personnel article ran six pages and offered pithy positive
advice. The average law journal article ran 29 pages and described the
complexity of the legal situation. Many of these advised rapid response
to harassment complaints but described the potential downside of griev-
ance procedures.
To chronicle the published advice of personnel and legal experts, we
collected all articles from the most cited, continuously publishedpersonnel
and management journals, on the one hand, and law reviews and legal
journals (for practitioners), on the other, between 1977 (when threefederal
district courts deﬁned harassment as illegal) and 1997 (the year of our
organizational survey on harassment programs).
3 We combine personnel
and management journalsin onecategorybecausepersonnelexpertswrote
most of the management articles on harassment (a list of journals is avail-
able from the authors). We searched 41 personnel and management jour-
nals and 166 law journals (most law schools publish journals, replete with
footnotes, hence there are more oft-cited law than personnel journals).
We found 152 personnel and management articles and 281 law articles
with “sexual harassment” in the title or abstract. We excluded letters to
the editor and brief comments.
Personnel and management articles were more likely than legal articles
to mention grievance procedures and harassment training, and markedly
so given that legal articles were nearly ﬁve times as long as personnel
articles.
What we ﬁnd is that legal articles frequently mentioned the “strict
liability” standard when they mentioned grievance procedures. In reading
these articles, we discovered that they typically mentioned grievance pro-
cedures to make the point that the strict liability standard rendered such
measures useless in court.
In ﬁgures 1 and 2 we show the number of articles on sexual harassment
published in each three-year period in law and in personnel journals, and
the number of those mentioning education and training (ﬁg. 1) and strict
liability and grievance(ﬁg. 2). Becausethereweremorelawthanpersonnel
3 We chose the most cited law journals from Hein OnLine’s “Core U.S./Most Cited
Law Journals” list and the most cited personnel and business journals from the ISI
Journal Citation Report, 2003 Social Sciences Edition. For personnel and business
journals, we looked at the ISI categories business; business, ﬁnance; industrialrelations
and labor; management; psychology, applied; and public administration. We collected
the articles from Hein OnLine, LegalTrac, LexisNexis, JStor, ABI/Inform, and EBSCO
Academic/Master. Those not available electronically we photocopied and scanned. We
ran scanned articles and nonsearchable pdf ﬁles through a character-recognition pro-
gram to render them searchable. We read through the articles to eliminate those not
primarily about sexual harassment. We used Google Desktop to search for terms. A
full list of the journals is available from the authors upon request.American Journal of Sociology
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Fig. 1.—Law and HR articles on sexual harassment mentioning training and education
articles, we use two vertical axes (left axis for law, right for personnel).
In ﬁgure 1, for instance, between 1980 and 1982 there were 36 law articles,
ﬁve mentioning education and three mentioning training. In the same
period, there were 12 personnel articles, four mentioning education and
four mentioning training. Personnel articles were much more likely to
mention education and training as part of their prescription. Overall,
among the personnel articles, 43% mentioned trainingand21%mentioned
education. Among the law articles, 1% mentioned training and 13% men-
tioned education. This can be seen readily by scanning the solid light bars
(law), and the striped light bars (HR). From the start, it was personnel
experts who were advocating training and education as strategies for
dealing with harassment.
Figure 2 shows that harassment articlesinpersonneljournalsfrequently
mentioned grievance procedures and rarely mentioned the “strictliability”
standard, under which procedures provided no protection. We graph the
number of HR/management articles mentioning “grievance” or “proce-
dure.” We also graph “strict liability.” Compare the two professions.Fewer
of the law articles mention grievance procedures. Overall, 26% of the law
articles and 34% of the personnel articles mention grievanceprocedures—
despite the fact that the legal articles averaged nearly ﬁve times the length
of the personnel articles. Moreover, in the critical period of the mid-1980s,
when employers were choosing compliance strategies, law articles regu-
larly discussed “strict liability” to argue that under this standard, pre-
ventative measures would not protect employers in court. Between 1983Legal Compliance
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Fig. 2.—Law and HR articles on sexual harassment mentioning strict liability and
grievance.
and 1991, 17 law articles mentioned grievances, and 15 mentioned strict
liability. Overall only seven of 155 personnel articles mentioned “strict
liability.”
We expect that employers consulting personnel experts will be signif-
icantly more likely to adopt both harassment procedures and training.
We expect that employers consulting lawyers will be signiﬁcantly less
likely to adopt harassment procedures.
Summary of Predictions
Our review of the professional literature leads us to the following expec-
tations. Personnel’s tradition of creating bureaucratic remedies to prob-
lems of legal compliance gave it an advantage in appealing to executives
interested in risk reduction. The legal profession’s tradition of advising
case-by-case remedies, and its resistance to routinizing solutions, put it
at a disadvantage in appealing to the same executives. Each time a legal
landmark seemed to heighten the risk ofliability,weexpectthatexecutives
became more likely to grab hold of personnel’s two ready-made solutions.
Executives who listened to lawyers were less likely to install grievance
procedures; those who listened to personnel experts were more likely. The
same should not hold for training, which personnel devised but which
lawyers seldom objected to. Our historical account suggests the following
hypotheses about organizational adoption of harassment programs:
Hypothesis 1.—Sexual harassment initiatives devised and promoted
by personnel experts will spread more quickly after 1977, following theAmerican Journal of Sociology
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Barnes, Garber, and Tomkins decisions; again after 1986, following the
Meritor decision; and again after 1991, following the new Civil Rights
Act.
Hypothesis 2.—Employers with HR departments, those usingHRcon-
sultants, and those with full-time antiharassment staff members will be
more likely to adopt training and both kinds of harassment procedures.
Hypothesis 3.—Employers who relied on lawyers for advice were less
likely to adopt grievance procedures.
Hypothesis 4.—Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed punitive
damages in cases involving private-sector employers, private-sector or-
ganizations will be signiﬁcantly more likely to install antiharassment pro-
grams after 1991.
OTHER FACTORS SHAPING HARASSMENT PROGRAMS
Here we review theories with predictions about antiharassmentprograms.
We then outline the factors we control for in the analyses.
Organizational Demography and the Risk of Harassment
The contact hypothesis suggests that harassment increases with exposure
to men (Gruber 1998; Gutek, Cohen, and Konrad 1990; Kauppinen-
Toropainen and Gruber 1993), and that the percentage of men in the
workplace increases the incidence of harassment (De Coster, Estes, and
Mueller 1999). If harassment itself elicits antiharassment measures, then
the percentage of men should increase the use of sexual harassment pro-
cedures and training, and the percentage of nonminorities should increase
the use of general harassment procedures that cover racial harassment.
Alternatively, when there are many women in an organization, man-
agers may feel that the risk of a harassment claim is greater. Furthermore,
in class action suits, a greater number of women does translate into a
larger ﬁnancial risk. If heightened sensitivity prompts antiharassment
measures, then the percentage of women should increase the use of ha-
rassment procedures and training.
Size, Age, Inertia
Scale predicts the formalization of many policies (Blau and Schoenherr
1971; Kalleberg and Van Buren 1996). Bigger establishments, and those
that are part of larger organizations, should be more likely to formalize
harassment programs. Stinchcombe (1965) and Selznick (1957) both argue
that as organizations age they become resistant to change, and less likelyLegal Compliance
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to adopt innovations. Because there were two waves of harassment griev-
ance procedures—sexual and then general harassment procedures—we
expect that inertia will stall employer replacement of sexual harassment
policies by general harassment policies.
Unionization
Unions have historically called for codiﬁcation of employee rights and
due process procedures. Yet some union ofﬁcials argued that their griev-
ance procedure was the right venue for harassment claims, and this may
have slowed adoption of distinct harassment procedures (Hauck 1999).
Professionalization of the Workforce
Neo-Marxist labor economists (Edwards 1979; Gordon, Edwards, and
Reich 1982) contend that organizations in the primary labor market are
most likely to protect the rights of employees. Weexpectthatorganizations
in which the most common job is professional or managerial will be more
likely to adopt antiharassment policies.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
We drew a national sample of workplaces, stratiﬁed by sector and size,
from the Dun and Bradstreet Market Identiﬁer database, whichKalleberg
et al. (1990, p. 664) describe as the most comprehensive of available sam-
pling frames. The industries and sectors in the sample are diverse: food,
chemicals, computer manufacturing, transportation manufacturing,
trucking, wholesale trade, banking, business services, hospitals, nonproﬁt
social services, and government. We set minimum size at 50 employees.
The Survey Research Center at the University of Maryland conducted
telephone interviews in the latter half of 1997, completing 389 interviews
that covered the history of HR practices back to 1965. We wrote to HR
managers, or general managers in organizations without HR managers,
and asked permission to interview a person “familiar with the history of
your human resource policies.” Interviewers reported that they almost
always spoke to HR managers in organizations with HR departments,
and to general managers in the 30% of workplaces that lacked HR de-
partments. Seventy-four percent of the organizations we were able to
contact by phone cooperated. The overall response rate, which includes
in the denominator those respondents we were not able to contact by
telephone after repeated attempts, was 56%. Similar surveys have yieldedAmerican Journal of Sociology
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comparable response rates. Milliken, Martins, and Morgan (1998) report
a rate of 18%, Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985) report 35%, Blau et al. (1976)
report 36%, Edelman (1992) reports 54%, Dobbin et al. (1993) report 45%,
and Guthrie and Roth (1999) report 57%. In 1997 the modal size was 430
employees; the mean was 1,445.
We investigated response bias with data from the 749 contacted estab-
lishments in the Dun and Bradstreet sampling frame. In logisticregression
models of survey response, government agencies were signiﬁcantly more
likely to respond than nonproﬁts, service ﬁrms, or manufacturing ﬁrms.
The factors that did not predict response were establishment size, orga-
nization size, subsidiary status, branch/headquarter status, region, and
female chief executive. Response bias may affect the means for outcome
variables, but we are conﬁdent that response bias does not contaminate
the statistical results because we can control for the obvious sources of
bias in the models.
For the discrete-time event-history analyses described below, we gen-
erated a data set with 9,844 organization-by-year spells of data. We retain
organization-year records for each year in which the organization was at
risk of adopting the practice in question. Organizations that had not
adopted a practice by 1997 are included for the whole period. We omit
a small number of organizational spells for which data for covariates are
missing. The total number of spells considered in the analyses rangesfrom
5,911 for sexual harassment procedures to 7,414 for sexual harassment
training programs. We model the adoption of 335 sexual harassment pro-
cedures, 249 general harassment procedures, and 284 antiharassment
training programs.
Before the survey we conducted 19 face-to-face interviews with HR
professionals in the New York metropolitan area, whom we selected ran-
domly from Hoover’s Directory of Human Resources Executives (1996).
After the survey we conducted another 41 in-person interviews with HR
executives in California, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York, selected
randomly from the Dun’s list. In these interviews we investigated the
decisions to adopt (or to avoid) a variety of HR policies and programs,
including antiharassment programs. Above, we quote some of those
managers.
Measures and Model Speciﬁcation
Harassment policies.—We asked respondents whether, and when, they
had established each harassment policy. We model theadoption ofasexual
harassment procedure, a more elaborate general antiharassment proce-
dure, and an antiharassment training program. In the survey,interviewers
mentioned both kinds of harassment procedures and read deﬁnitions toLegal Compliance
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respondents who did not recognize both. In ﬁgure 3 we show the per-
centage of employers with each practice, over time. Each practice rose
dramatically over this period. Organizations that abandon a practicereen-
ter the risk set, but this happened rarely.
Independent variables.—Table 1 lists univariate statistics. Measures
were collected at the establishment level and vary over time, exceptwhere
noted. Appendix table A1 reports a correlation matrix for all 9,844 spells
of data. We asked about number employed at 10-year intervals, asked
about years of large gains and losses, and interpolated size ﬁgures for
intervening years. We asked about proportion minority and female at 10-
year intervals and interpolated. We measure the presence of union con-
tract, HR department, sexual harassment staff position, HR consultants,
and diversity training with binary variables. Our pilot interviews indi-
cated that some HR departments consult attorneys about HR policy—
either house counsel or outside counsel—and others do not, so we included
a survey item to gauge that. The presence of a legal department did not
have an effect in the models, hence we omit the variable for simplicity.
Multiestablishment ﬁrm, sector, and workforce professionalization are
time invariant. For professionalization, we looked up the most common
job in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and assigned a score of 1 if
it was deﬁned as professional or managerial. We replaced missing values
for the date of adoption of practices and structures with the median date.
We did not estimate date of adoption for any dependent variable. In a
sensitivity analysis we found that treating the estimated data as missing
did not alter the results.
To examine the effects of legal landmarks we include overlapping bi-
nary variables for 1978–97 for the three district court ﬁndings, 1987–97
for the Supreme Court’s Meritor decision, and 1992–97 for the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. We begin each period in the ﬁrst full year after the
legal landmark. Overlapping periods make it easy to see whether each
legal shift substantially increased the likelihood of adoption above and
beyond the effects of previous policy shifts. We include a linear time trend
to rule out the possibility that the periods capture a simple secular trend.
Estimation
We use discrete-time event-history methods because we do not know the
exact timing of adoption within the spells and because we have many
“tied” events, that is, years in which multiple employers adopt harassment
policies (Allison 1995, pp. 220–22; Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice 1980). In par-American Journal of Sociology
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Fig. 3.—The spread of harassment policies
ticular, we employ discrete models where the hazard (instantaneous risk)
at time t for an organization with characteristics i is:
 (X b) i h(tFX ) p h (t). ( 1 ) i 0
Here is a baseline hazard function describing the risk for organi- h (t) 0
zations with baseline characteristics , and the exponentiate is
 X p 0( X b) i
a proportionate increaseorreductioninriskassociatedwithcharacteristics
Xi.
Because the transformed data set contains annual spells, the hazard of
adoption in each year is equivalent to Pit, the conditional probability that
the event occurs to organization i in year t, given that it has not already
occurred. We model the complementary log-log transformation of the
cumulative survival function on the covariates, speciﬁed for that (1  P ) it
time:
 log[log(1  P )] p a(t)  b X .( 2 ) it it
The complementary log-log transformation takes a variable with the val-
ues of 0 and 1, marking the occurrence of the event in a given year, and
changes it to a continuous value which ranges from minus inﬁnity to plus
inﬁnity (Allison 1995, p. 216). The coefﬁcients estimated by this procedure
have a proportional hazards, or relative risk, interpretation.TABLE 1
Variable Descriptions
Variable Deﬁnition Mean SD Min Max
Organizational factors:
Establishment size ....................... Log of number of employees 5.76 1.57 0 11
Multiestablishment organization ....... Part of a larger organization .76 .43 0 1
Age ........................................ Y ears since founding 46.22 49.71 1 350
Union ..................................... Presence of a union contract .30 .46 0 1
Professionalization ....................... Core job is professional/managerial .35 .48 0 1
%minority ................................ Percentage of the workforce 23.40 20.27 0 100
%female .................................. Percentage of the workforce 48.40 25.94 0 100
Public sector ............................. Local, state, or federal government .28 .45 0 1
Sexual harassment procedure ........... Presence of a procedure .33 .47 0 1
Professional inﬂuence:
HR department .......................... Presence of an HR department .52 .50 0 1
HR consultant ........................... Use outside HR consultants .28 .45 0 1
Legal consultant ......................... Consult with attorney on HR matters .66 .47 0 1
Sexual harassment staff position ....... Full-time employee working on sexual
harassment .05 .21 0 1
Diversity training employees ........... Provide diversity training to employees .11 .32 0 1
Periods:
Time ...................................... Time trend (years since 1965) 18.85 9.34 1 33
Period 1978–97 ........................... Binary indicator .69 .46 0 1
Period 1987–97 ........................... Binary indicator .41 .49 0 1
Period 1992–97 ........................... Binary indicator .23 .42 0 1
Interactions:
Female#public sector ................... Interaction 12.16 22.48 0 100
Public#1992–97 ......................... Interaction .06 .23 0 1
Note.— . Np 9,844American Journal of Sociology
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We present three nested models for each outcome, identical except that
we include sexual harassment procedure as an independent variable in
models for the other two outcomes. We expect organizations that adopt
this ﬁrst-wave response will be slower to adopt the other two responses.
We explore whether variables representing our arguments show sig-
niﬁcant effects, net of those of variables representing existing theories. In
the baseline models (table 2, models 1, 4, and 7) we include variables
representing existing theories plus reliance on HR and legal professionals.
In the subsequent models (table 2, models 2, 5, and 8) we add the three
overlapping periods to see whether shifts in the legal environment have
important effects. In models 3, 6, and 9, we consider sector differences.
We add public#1992–97 to see whether private-sector organizations be-
came more susceptible after personnel played up new punitive damages.
We also include an interaction between sector and percentage female,
because initial analyses revealed that feminization has different effects in
public and private sectors.
FINDINGS
Personnel experts and lawyers mediate the effects of the law, and they
do so in strikingly different ways. Each time a legal landmark appeared
to raise organizational risk, more executives followed personnel’s pre-
scription of grievance procedures. Organizations that looked to HR pro-
fessionals for advice were signiﬁcantly more likely to adopt sexual ha-
rassment procedures and training. Organizations that looked to lawyers
were less likely to adopt both sexual and general harassment procedures.
Moreover, private ﬁrms alone became signiﬁcantly more likely to adopt
general harassment procedures after Congress approved punitive damage
awards in private-sector cases.
Legal Landmarks
Executives embraced personnel’s prescriptions—sexual and general ha-
rassment procedures—ingreaternumbersafterboththe1977districtcourt
rulings and the 1986 Meritor ruling. These effects can be seen in the
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for each time period, in models 2 and 5. They also
increased use of sexual harassment procedures after the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, as can be seen in model 2. Each signiﬁcant coefﬁcient suggests
that a legal landmark ramped up adoptions net of the linear increase
captured by the time trend. Coefﬁcients for the latter two periods reﬂect
increases in the propensity to adopt above and beyond both the time trend
and the earlier period effects, suggesting a stepwise rise. The legal land-Legal Compliance
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marks do not show the same stepwise effects on training programs, al-
though coefﬁcients for time trend show an increasing risk.
The third legal landmark, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, changed ha-
rassment law only for private-sector ﬁrms by introducing the possibility
of punitive damage awards for these organizations. If private ﬁrms are
more susceptible to adopting harassment policies after 1991, period 1992–
97 will show a positive effect, and public#1992–97 will show a negative
effect. For the general harassment procedure, model 5 suggests that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 has no effect. In fact, sector differences have
masked the act’s effect. In model 6, the coefﬁcient for period 1992–97
(.502; ), shows a positive effect in the private sector, and the co- P ! .05
efﬁcient for public#1992–97 (.769; ) shows that this effect is P ! .05
washed out in public agencies. Model 6 ﬁts signiﬁcantly better than the
models without interactions. General harassment procedures—which in-
stitute parallel treatment of race and sex harassment claims—are the only
practices that show these sector differences.
Professional Inﬂuence on Organizational Practices
We expected that HR departments, HR consultants, and full-time sexual
harassment experts would encourage employers to adopt all three policies.
For sexual harassment procedures, the presence of an HR department
shows a strong and consistent effect in models 1 through 3. In models 4,
5, and 6, none of the personnel measures affected general harassment
procedures, but note two things. First, personnel’s effects can be seen in
the coefﬁcients for legal landmarks, for personnel inventedtheharassment
procedure, and only personnel unequivocally backed it. Second, in models
4, 5, and 6, the ﬁrst-wave response (sexual harassment procedure) shows
a negative effect on general harassment procedure. Sexual harassment
procedures were predicted by personnel variables, suggesting that exec-
utives who relied on HR experts were more likely to add sexual harass-
ment procedures early, but then less likely, because of the inertia of those
early procedures, to add general harassment procedures.
The effects of HR experts on the adoption of training are evident
through three different variables. In models 7, 8, and 9, HR consultant,
sexual harassment staff position, and diversitytrainingallshowsigniﬁcant
positive effects. HR department does not show an effect here, but does
show an effect when we omit HR consultant. The positive effect of di-
versity training suggests that where trainers have a toehold, they sell
harassment training. Employers who consulted with attorneys were less
likely to adopt sexual harassment procedures, in models 1, 2, and 3, and
general harassment procedures, in models 4, 5, and 6. They were no less
likely to adopt harassment training, as predicted.1
2
3
2
TABLE 2
Estimates of the Adoption of Sexual Harassment Policies
Variable
Sexual Harassment
Procedure
General Harassment
Procedure Antiharassment Training
123456789
Establishment size (log) ................ .101* .104* .104* .124* .127* .134** .239** .237** .240**
(.045) (.045) (.045) (.050) (.050) (.050) (.050) (.050) (.049)
Multiestablishment organization ...... .189 .196 .193 .483** .493** .497** .276 .285 .259
(.138) (.139) (.139) (.160) (.160) (.160) (.156) (.155) (.157)
Age ...................................... .002 .002 .002 .003 .003 .003 .004* .004* .003*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Union .................................... .061 .075 .058 .150 .163 .174 .156 .167 .157
(.148) (.148) (.149) (.166) (.166) (.166) (.152) (.152) (.152)
Professionalization ...................... .013 .007 .014 .389** .383** .391** .274* .263 .290*
(.129) (.128) (.129) (.144) (.144) (.144) (.139) (.139) (.139)
%minority ............................... .002 .003 .002 .004 .004 .005 .004 .004 .003
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
%female ................................. .003 .003 .004 .001 .001 .003 .003 .003 .006*
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Public sector ............................ .290 .292 .559 .583** .584** 1.198* .120 .115 .845*
(.152) (.153) (.347) (.186) (.186) (.474) (.159) (.158) (.412)
Sexual harassment procedure ......... .823** .755** .756** .269 .218 .213
(.175) (.179) (.179) (.144) (.146) (.145)
HR department ......................... .299* .304* .289* .008 .028 .048 .193 .180 .163
(.135) (.136) (.136) (.155) (.156) (.156) (.147) (.147) (.147)1
2
3
3
HR consultant .......................... .159 .149 .155 .012 .012 .026 .370** .365** .362**
(.131) (.131) (.132) (.152) (.152) (.153) (.133) (.133) (.134)
Legal consultant ........................ .305* .305* .320* .385* .402** .418** .034 .044 .068
(.129) (.129) (.131) (.156) (.156) (.157) (.169) (.169) (.170)
Sexual harassment staff position ...... .063 .121 .112 .117 .130 .095 .903** .890** .818**
(.401) (.404) (.405) (.375) (.376) (.376) (.296) (.295) (.296)
Diversity training ....................... .005 .016 .002 .117 .069 .035 .595** .618** .644**
(.203) (.205) (.205) (.212) (.212) (.213) (.171) (.171) (.172)
Time ..................................... .200** .096** .097** .171** .075* .076* .193** .146** .147**
(.010) (.029) (.029) (.012) (.033) (.033) (.013) (.034) (.034)
Period 1978–97 ......................... 1.102** 1.097** 1.246** 1.229** .918 .895
(.405) (.405) (.467) (.467) (.573) (.574)
Period 1987–97 ......................... .777** .773** .755** .747** .421 .413
(.233) (.233) (.277) (.277) (.276) (.276)
Period 1992–97 ......................... .516** .581** .377 .502* .092 .071
(.191) (.201) (.227) (.233) (.222) (.235)
Female#public ......................... .007 .019* .019**
(.006) (.008) (.007)
Public#1992–97 ........................ .280 .769* .070
(.280) (.351) (.271)
Intercept ................................. 7.151** 6.413** 6.387* 7.416** 6.904** 6.923** 9.036* 9.070* 8.931*
(.375) (.458) (.462) (.427) (.521) (.523) (.474) (.644) (.644)
Log likelihood .......................... 986.82 979.44 978.38 896.71 891.30 886.56 928.39 926.10 922.42
N (spells) ................................ 5,911 5,911 5,911 6,904 6,904 6,904 7,414 7,414 7,414
N (events) ............................... 335 335 335 249 249 249 284 284 284
Note.—SEs in parentheses.
*. P !.05
** . P !.01American Journal of Sociology
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Other Factors
Control variables generally show the expected effects or no effects at all.
Large employers are consistently more likely to adopt each kind of ha-
rassment policy. Multiestablishment organization has a positive effect on
general harassment procedure. Age shows the expected negative effect on
training program. Unionization does not show signiﬁcant effects. Work-
force professionalization shows positive effects on generalharassmentpro-
cedures and training.
Sex composition at ﬁrst appears not to have an effect, contradicting
both the contact hypothesis, that predominantly male organizations will
produce more harassment and thus more programs to curb it, and the
sensitivity hypothesis, that in predominantly female organizations, man-
agers will be more sensitive to the issue. However, when we introduced
an interaction in exploratory analysis, we discovered that feminization
stimulates public agencies, but not private ﬁrms, to adopt general ha-
rassment procedures and antiharassment training. In model 6, percentage
female taps feminization in the private sector and does not show a sig-
niﬁcant effect, but female#public shows a signiﬁcant positive effect. The
same pattern can be seen for training in model 9. For the public sector,
an increase in feminization increases the hazard of adopting both
measures.
4
CONCLUSION
When three federal courts ruled in 1977 that harassment constituted sex
discrimination, personnel experts played two old standards from their
repertoire, the grievance procedure and the training program. These came
to be ubiquitous. We show not merely that personnel experts got their
way, but that they convinced executives to listen to their advice even as
lawyers advised executives to deal with cases individually and swiftly,
and even as some lawyers advised that grievance procedures might back-
ﬁre. Personnel promised a bureaucratic vaccine against lawsuits for ha-
rassment. They built that promise on an analogy to the union grievance
mechanism, for aggrieved unionists were contractually required to use
arbitration. The promise appealed to executives concerned about legal
liability. Attorneys’ advice, to respond swiftly to complaints with an ac-
ceptable remedy overseen by a lawyer, was based in their tradition of
case consultation and attention to precedent. This did not play so well to
4 The sector difference is signiﬁcant for general harassment procedures when femini-
zation is in the range of 0%–43%, and for training when feminization is in the range
0%–11%.Legal Compliance
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managers who wanted a routine inoculation against liability. Every time
a legal landmark seemed to increase the risk of lawsuit, executivesbecame
more likely to take personnel’s unproven advice. Executives who con-
sulted HR experts were more likely to follow that advice. And those who
consulted lawyers were more likely to take their advice and hold off on
grievance procedures. In the end, the growing risk of liability and the
absence of clear judicial guidance led almost all employers to embrace
the preventative measures on offer, grievance procedures, and training.
Viewed from the perspective of Abbott’s holistic approach to under-
standing the system of professions, Edelman et al.’s (1999) insight that in
1998 the Supreme Court vetted personnel’s recommendations takes on
new meaning. The case of harassment suggests that the courts follow
organizational practice, to be sure—that the law is endogenous to orga-
nizations, in Edelman’s (2002) famous phrasing—but also that executives
are becoming increasingly important in adjudicating professional exper-
tise, and that their preferences are becoming increasingly salient in pro-
fessional turf battles. Their preferences are now more likely to be written
into case law as well.
One consequence of the organizational absorption of vast domains of
social activity over the last two centuries is that jurisdictional struggles
among expert groups are increasingly played out within networks of or-
ganizations rather than within nation-states (Abbott 1988). Employer re-
sponse to sexual harassment law highlightsthechangingcharacterofthese
struggles. While the Supreme Court eventually endorsed personnel’scom-
pliance approach for cases with certain fact patterns, the profession’s
authority did not come through state licensure. Instead, executives gave
personnel unofﬁcial license to take charge of harassment by adopting
grievance procedures and training programs in large numbers. America’s
common law system and regulatory uncertainty create an opening for
expert groups to claim legal expertise in executive suites. Lawyers’ claims
to expertise in legal precedent may be less relevant than claims from other
groups to substantive knowledge, and to remedies appropriate to large
organizations (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Zippel 2006). This goes for HR
managers in the ﬁeld of civil rights, but it also goes for engineers in
environmental regulation and healthandsafetystandards,foraccountants
in beneﬁts regulation, and for both accountants and ﬁnancial managers
in securities regulation (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Fligstein 1990; Ocasio
and Kim 1999; Stryker 2000). If accountants and justices of the peace
won certain corporate legal work early in England because of a scarcity
of lawyers, as Abbott (1988) argues, other experts groups are winning
legal work in American organizations as executives seek bureaucratic
remedies to substantive regulatory problems, remedies of the sort lawyers
seldom offer. Executives favor innovations that are smooth running andAmerican Journal of Sociology
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predictable, and so favor systems that routinize solutions and minimize
discretion (Van de Ven et al. 1999). Lawyers tend to offer solutions that
treat casesindividually andthatrelyonthediscretionofcorporatecounsel.
The increasing complexity of management domains subject to regu-
lation—personnel administration, but also environmental protection,
health and safety, beneﬁts administration, and ﬁnancial reporting—has
contributed to the trend, we suspect, in two ways. On the one hand, it
has catalyzed executive interest in routinized, smooth-running solutions
to problems of reporting and regulatory compliance, because executives
equate solving a complex problem with routinizing a solution. On the
other hand, it has meant the increasing specialization of regulatory ex-
pertise. Corporations more and more retain specialist lawyers to handle
taxes, employment, mergers, bankruptcy, and a host of other issues. Cor-
porate law has not been a uniﬁed ﬁeld for some time. They also increas-
ingly turn to a host of other professional groups, with substantive rather
than legal expertise, for compliance strategies.
Attorneys’ superior grasp of the law would seem to give them the upper
hand in professional turf battles, but the legal profession’s ethos ofcaution
and attention to precedent puts it at a distinct disadvantage when dealing
with executives seeking to reduce risk in the context of legal uncertainty.
Executives do not always seek the most efﬁcient solutions to problems of
management, as organizational sociologists and agency theoristshavelong
argued (Fligstein 2001; Jensen and Meckling 1976; March and Simon
1958). In the case of harassment, they embraced remedies that had no
more than a shot at reducing risk. Yet attorneys offered no distinct pre-
ventative—not even one that was a long shot—being reluctant to design
a preventative that the courts might reject. In the case of sexual harass-
ment, executives’ penchant for stable bureaucratic solutions appears to
have favored personnel’s grievance procedures and training programs,
even though there was no cost-beneﬁt analysis that could support them.
Attorneys’ arguments that employers should simply respond promptly to
complaints of harassment were no consolation to executives who wanted
something to point to as evidence they had addressed the problem. At-
torneys themselves came around by the mid-1990s, as more and more
employment-law experts advised adopting grievance mechanisms to han-
dle conﬂicts, but they remained reticent to argue that grievance mecha-
nisms would actually protect employers in court. Lawyers may well have
recognized that at a certain point in the diffusion process, the lack of a
harassment grievance mechanism signaled recklessness. That appears to
have been the Supreme Court’s view, for the court resisted vetting griev-
ance procedures in 1986, when they were still relatively rare, but accepted
them in 1998, by which time they were commonplace.
Our analysis highlights the increasing importance of executives in de-Legal Compliance
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ﬁning professional expertise and jurisdiction, and the declining salience
of judges and legislatures. It highlights the increasing importance of man-
agerial risk as an incentive and, perhaps, the declining importance of
problem remediation. The popular programs were oriented to reducing
the risk of lawsuit more than to reducing the incidence of harassment.
Eventually they were shown to reduce legal risk, because the courts ac-
cepted as legal what had become popular, but not to reduce the incidence
of harassment. Executives spent untold millions setting up training pro-
grams that have not yet been shown to reduce harassment (Bisom-Rapp
2001a) and establishing grievance procedures that were unproven in court
and that did not reduce complaints to the government (Edelman et al.
1999). We have been arguing that executives prefer formal bureaucratic
remedies that can routinize legal compliance, but it is also the case that
the courts have come to reinforce such solutions because they constitute
standards that can be applied across cases. What matters, before the
courts, is not whether the employer has a system for addressing harass-
ment complaints and preventing harassment that has been proven effec-
tive, in the workplace in question oranywhereforthatmatter,butwhether
the employer has a system that symbolizes commitment to those ideals
(Sturm 2001, p. 563). Thus executives and judges alike have contributed
to personnel’s success, for personnel had a plausible compliance remedy
that offered executives a formalized solution, and judges a bright-line
standard by which they could assess employers. Neither group seemed
particularly concerned that the solution was, perhaps, of no more than
ceremonial value (Meyer and Rowan 1977).APPENDIX A
TABLE A1
Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1. Establishment size
2. Multiestablishment
organization .13
3. Age .20 .03
4. Union .31 .14 .23
5. Professionalization .06 .21 .05 .22
6. HR department .43 .09 .01 .13 .06
7. HR consultant .29 .08 .11 .11 .05 .34
8. Legal consultant .31 .09 .05 .18 .02 .41 .36
9. Sexual harassment staff
position .09 .07 .01 .02 .02 .11 .14 .12
10. Diversity training .21 .04 .03 .08 .06 .23 .28 .21 .20
11. %nonwhite .03 .01 .07 .07 .03 .05 .05 .06 .06 .07
12. %female .02 .19 .05 .12 .31 .06 .02 .03 .01 .06 .00
13. Public sector .08 .30 .28 .31 .27 .11 .05 .03 .01 .00 .10 .10
14. Time .11 .00 .01 .10 .02 .24 .37 .42 .19 .37 .14 .11 .06
15. Period 1978–97 .08 .01 .01 .10 .01 .20 .27 .34 .13 .23 .11 .10 .05 .83
16. Period 1987–97 .10 .01 .01 .07 .02 .21 .34 .38 .18 .35 .12 .09 .05 .83 .56
17. Period 1992–97 .10 .01 .02 .04 .02 .17 .31 .29 .17 .39 .10 .07 .04 .69 .37 .66
18. Female#public sector .08 .26 .18 .29 .20 .07 .07 .04 .01 .02 .10 .11 .88 .01 .01 .00 .00
19. Public#1992–97 .09 .12 .14 .18 .09 .05 .18 .13 .09 .23 .01 .01 .40 .31 .17 .29 .44 .41
20. Sexual harassment
procedure .17 .03 .02 .08 .06 .32 .35 .36 .26 .39 .06 .08 .08 .66 .46 .64 .61 .01 .26
21. Harassment training .25 .07 .00 .08 .06 .31 .39 .32 .33 .52 .07 .05 .02 .54 .35 .53 .55 .04 .28 .66
22. General procedure .13 .05 .05 .00 .10 .23 .28 .27 .26 .28 .13 .06 .12 .52 .36 .50 .47 .06 .14 .66 .54Legal Compliance
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